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A standard oligopoly model of bundling shows that bundling by a …rm
with a monopoly over one product has a strategic e¤ect because it changes
the substitution relationships between the goods among which consumers
choose. Bundling in appropriate proportions is privately pro…table, reduces
rivals’ pro…ts and overall welfare, and may drive rivals from the market.
¤ This note arose out of comments prepared when I was asked to discuss a conference presen-
tation of Slade (1998). I am grateful to Margaret Slade and to a referee for useful comments on
an earlier draft; responsibility for errors is my own.1. Introduction
The economic and legal literatures on bundling, like the much larger related lit-
eratures on tying, emphasize consequences of the practice that are e¢ciency-
enhancing in the sense that they may allow a …rm that possesses a given degree of
market power to extract more consumers’ surplus, but they do not decrease net
social welfare.1
This e¢ciency view of bundling is apparently so prevalent that (at least some)
commentators feel justi…ed in denying that there is a basis for policy concern with
the practice (DeLong, 1998):
Microsoft is also attacked for “tying” because it wants to bundle its
Internet browser into its operating system. But except under unusual
conditionsof monopoly power, scholarsand courtsno longerviewtying
as a serious antitrust concern; there hasn’t been a major tying case in
the U.S. in at least 20 years.
Grimes (1994) puts forward a number of reservations about the validity of such
an e¢ciency presumption when market imperfections are taken into account. The
point of this note is that an e¢ciency presumption is unjusti…ed even without
allowing for market imperfections.2 Bundling has a strategic e¤ect because it
changes the substitution relationships between the goods among which consumers
choose. Bundling in appropriate proportions is privately pro…table, reduces rivals’
pro…ts and overall welfare, and may drive rivals from the market.
2. Demand
We work with a simple and standard model of consumer behavior.3 Let market
demand for two goods 1 and 2 be derived from a social welfare function of the
1Adams and Yellen (1976) emphasize the role of bundling as a vehicle for price discrimina-
tion; see also Schmalensee (1984). Bowman (1957) and Burstein (1960a, 1960b) are seminal
presentations of the e¢ciency interpretation of tying.
2There is a sense in which the present note is dual to Burstein (1960a). Using a model of one
monopolized product and a number of other products produced under competitive conditions, he
shows that there can be no presumption that tying is used to extend monopoly power from one
market to another. Using a model of one monopoly and one duopoly market, and taking strategic
and welfare consequences explicitly into account, I show that there can be no presumption that
bundling does not have such e¤ects.
3The earliest uses of which I am aware of this model are Spence (1976) and Dixit (1979).
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where m represents “all other goods.”
The parameter µ lies between -1 and +1. If µ = 1, the two goods are indepen-
dent in demand. If µ > 0, the two goods are substitutes, and for µ = 1, perfect
substitutes. If µ < 0, the two goods are complements.
Inverse demand curves for the two products are
p1 = a ¡ (Q1 + µQ2) (2.2)
and
p2 = a ¡ (µQ1 + Q2): (2.3)
The normalization that makes the slopes of the inverse demand curves equal
to -1 is without loss of generality.
We assume there are two …rms, A and B. Firm A is a monopolist of product
1,
Q1 = qA1: (2.4)
Both …rms produce product 2:
Q2 = qA2 + qB2 (2.5)
3. Bundling and Demand
Suppose …rm A sells its products only in the proportion kA of good 1 to one unit
of good 2; that is, …rm A o¤ers bA bundles
(kA;1): (3.1)
Firm B, which does not produce product 1, sells a “bundle” that consists only
of one unit of good 2,
(0;1): (3.2)
The relationships between the bundles and the underlying variables are
Q1 = kAbA (3.3)
and
Q2 = bA + bB; (3.4)
respectively, where bA is the numberof bundles sold by …rm1 and bB is the number
of bundles sold by …rm 2.
3Substitute (3.3) and (3.4) into (2.1) and rewrite the welfare function in terms
of bundles as
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B] (3.5)
The implied inverse demand curves are for bundles are
PA = (kA + 1)a ¡ [(1 + 2µkA + k
2
A)bA + (1 + µkA)bB] (3.6)
PB = a ¡ [(1 + µkA)bA + bB] (3.7)
Bundling has a strategic e¤ect because it alters — indeed, may even create —
substitutability relationships. If µ = 0, so that there is no demand relationship
between goods 1 and 2, the bundled goods are nonetheless demand substitutes.
4. Bundling and Payo¤s
Henceforth, for simplicity, let µ = 0, so the two goods are independent in demand.
This is not essential to the qualitative nature of the results that follow.4
Assume also that marginal cost is constant, c per unit, for both goods.5 For
the moment, leave the nature of …xed costs unspeci…ed.
Finally, assume that the …rms act as Cournot quantity-setting oligopolists.
4.1. Without bundling




(a ¡ c) (4.1)
qA2 = qB2 =
1
3
(a ¡ c): (4.2)
qA1 is monopoly output for good 1. qA2 and qB2 are Cournot duopoly outputs
for good 2.














4As a simplifying assumption, it does follow much of the literature on tying and bundling
(see, for example, Burstein, (1960a)).
5Unit cost can be made to di¤er for the two goods with some complication in the algebra,














Let kA = 1. This is su¢cient to bring out the strategic and welfare e¤ects of
bundling.6

























(a ¡ c) >
2
3
(a ¡ c): (4.9)
of the underlying goods.
Bundling reduces the output of good 1 and increases the output of good 2.
Firm A produces 3
7(a ¡ c) units of good 2, more than without bundling. Firm B
produces
2
7(a ¡ c) units of good 2, less than without bundling. This re‡ects the
fact that bundles are strategic as well as demand substitutes.
The increase in output of good 2 means that the price of …rm B’s “bundle”
is less than the equilibrium price of good 2 without bundling. Bundling by …rm
A means that …rm 2 sells less and at a lower price, compared with a situation in
which A does not bundle. Bundling therefore lowers …rm 2’s pro…t.


















2 = ¼B: (4.11)
6In many markets, the units in which goods are measured are essentially arbitrary. In others
(operating systems, web browsers) this may not be the case.
5These expressions are for payo¤s gross of …xed costs. If B’s …xed costs fall
in the appropriate range, it will be pro…table for B to operate if A does not
bundle, and become unpro…table for B to operate if A does bundle. In such cases,
bundling will allow A to extend a (possibly legal) monopoly over product 1 to
product 2.
5. Bundling and welfare









Firm A’s bundling therefore reduces social welfare, compared with the case in
which …rm A does not bundle. This establishes that an e¢ciency presumption for
bundling is unwarranted.
6. Policy Implications
Burstein (1960a, p. 68) wrote to show “that tying arrangements can be viewed in
a context apart from the extension of monopoly or exclusion of entry.” The force
of the present contribution is that the e¢ciency interpretation of multiproduct
marketing arrangements is possible but not necessary. The e¤ects of bundling in
the standard oligopoly model examined here are those ascribed to bundling by
the leverage theory. Bundling can allow a …rm with a monopoly in one market
to exercise greater market power in other markets, to strategically disadvantage
rivals in those markets, and to reduce net social welfare.
This does not establish that the e¤ect of bundling is necessarily to reduce
net social welfare. Cases may occur in which bundling increases quality;7 cases
may occur in which bundling reduces marginal or …xed cost. The net welfare
impact of bundling in such cases will involve the kind of welfare tradeo¤s raised by
Williamson (1968) in another context. But it cannot be presumed that bundling
does not worsen market performance.
7This would occur in the present model if the price-axis intercept of A’s bundle exceeds
(kA +1)a.
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